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LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: TEE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE
MAKNG OF ROE V. WADE. By David J. Garrow. New York: Mac-
millan Publishing Co. 1994. Pp. 981. $28.
In 1970, judicial recognition of abortion rights seemed far-
fetched. In January of that year, Linda Greenhouse wrote in the
New York Times Magazine about a "right to abortion" - describ-
ing "[s]uch a notion... [as] fantastic, illusory. The Constitution is
searched in vain for any mention of it. The very phrase rings of the
rhetoric of a Women's Liberation meeting."' While Greenhouse's
bit of hyperbole was a setup to one of the first full-blown popular
press treatments of burgeoning judicial recognition of abortion
rights, no one could have foreseen the prospect of a sweeping
Supreme Court decision invalidating forty-six state antiabortion
laws - at least not in 1970.
At that time, however, the events leading up to the Supreme
Court's Roe v. Wade2 decision had already been set in motion. In
the fall of 1969, Norma McCorvey - a.k.a. Jane Roe - realized
she was pregnant and sought legal counsel to attack Texas's an-
tiabortion statute. In June 1970, a three-judge federal district court
struck down Texas's antiabortion statute on privacy grounds.
3 Just
one year later, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Roe and
McCorvey's attorneys - Linda Coffee and Sarah Weddington -
were furiously working on their Court briefs. In January 1973, after
two oral arguments and the additions of Justices Lewis Powell and
William Rehnquist to the Court, the Supreme Court's opinion in
Roe sent shock waves throughout the nation.
How could a decision of such monumental import catch the na-
tion - including most legal academics - by surprise?4 Was Roe,
as Robert Bork suggests, a brazen "judicial usurpation of demo-
* Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William & Mary. A.B. 1978,
Georgetown; J.D. 1982, Vanderbilt. - Ed. Thanks to Kathy Abrams and Mary Dudziak for
useful commentary.
1. Linda J. Greenhouse, Constitutional Questionw Is There a Right to Abortion?, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 30.
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
4. See DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING
151, 170 n.33 (1976).
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cratic prerogatives"? 5 Alternatively, was Roe the inevitable out-
growth of Griswold v. Connecticut6 - a decision whose
precedential effect was not realized because it struck down "an un-
commonly silly law,"7 Connecticut's antiquated ban on the use of
contraceptives?
David J. Garrow's Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy
and the Making of Roe v. Wade8 helps answer these and many
other questions. Garrow meticulously uncovers the events leading
up to Griswold and Roe and the deliberations of the Justices and
their clerks in both cases. While the book - at close to 1000 pages
- is weighed down by its own thoroughness, Garrow lays bare the
efforts of reproductive freedom advocates and the Justices sympa-
thetic to their arguments.
Despite covering territory that Bernard Schwartz, Mary
Dudziak, and others have already explored,9 Liberty and Sexuality
is a strikingly original work. Garrow painstakingly details the
inner-workings of both the reproductive freedom community and
the Supreme Court in Griswold and Roe. By interviewing well over
two hundred individuals who participated in these controversies
and reading everything and anything connected to these disputes -
including the case files of former Justices William Brennan, William
0. Douglas, and Thurgood Marshall - Garrow has provided the
definitive account of the plaintiffs' side of Griswold and Roe. This
account, in and of itself, is an extraordinary achievement.
Liberty and Sexuality seeks to be much more than a history of
the Griswold and Roe litigation, however. Perceiving the constitu-
tional right to privacy to be a "basic truth" (p. 705) and Roe to be
"the legal and moral equivalent of Brown v. Board of Education,"'0
Liberty and Sexuality seeks to give Roe v. Wade its due as "a
landmark in the growth of American freedom.""' Garrow pursues
his normative ends through two techniques. First, Garrow focuses
his attention on the reproductive freedom community. By treating
5. ROBERT H. BoRK, TmE Tmn'nNo OF AMERICA 116 (1990).
6. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
7. 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
8. David Garrow is a legal historian whose Bearing the Cross won the Pulitzer Prize in
1987.
9. See BERNARD SCHWART7, TiE UNPunrsHED OPINIONS OF THE BURGER COURT 83-
151 (1988) [hereinafter ScHwARTZ, BURGER COURT]; BERNARD ScHwARTZ, THE UNPUB.
USBED OPON S OF THE WARREN COURT 227-39 (1985) [hereinafter SCHwARTZ, WARREN
COURT]; Mary L. Dudziak, Just Say No: Birth Control in the Connecticut Supreme Court
Before Griswold v. Connecticut, 75 IowA L. Rnv. 915 (1990); Catherine G. Roraback, Gris-
wold v. Connecticut: A Brief Case History, 16 OHio N.U. L. REv. 395 (1989).
10. Michael Anderson, From Civil Rights to Abortion Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1994,
§ 7 (Book Review), at 7 (quoting an interview with David Garrow).




the story of these social activists and lawyers as the one worth tell-
ing, Garrow - through an evenhanded but generally sympathetic
portrayal of these individuals - places his readers in the shoes of
one side of the bitter struggle over abortion. The prolife commu-
nity, to the extent Garrow considers it, is typically portrayed in less
sympathetic terms.12 For Garrow, who - in promoting Liberty and
Sexuality - has described Operation Rescue as "really beyond the
pale in just the same way the Klan is,"'13 the prolife community is
principally viewed as an obstacle on the path toward the achieve-
ment of liberty.
Garrow's second technique is purely factual. Specifically, by
demonstrating that Catholic interests in Connecticut effectively and
repeatedly blocked efforts to repeal that state's anticontraceptive
law and that a burgeoning right-to-life movement may well have
undermined prochoice legislative reform efforts, Liberty and Sexu-
ality implies that court action was instrumental to the cause of re-
productive freedom.' 4 In striking this significant blow for judicial
activism, Garrow masterfully rebuffs two strands of historically
based criticism of Griswold and Roe. First, Garrow lays to rest the
claim that Yale law professors cooked up Griswold because, as
Judge Borkoput it at his confirmation hearing, "they like this kind of
litigation."' 5 Instead, he demonstrates that before Griswold struck
it down, Connecticut's anticontraception law had blocked creation
of family planning centers for low-income women for more than
two decades, thereby providing an equity-based justification for the
lawsuit. Second, contrary to the recent wave of attacks by
prochoice liberals - including Clinton Supreme Court appointee
12. Garrow limits his description of John Noonan - then a University of California law
professor and now a federal appeals court judge - to three words: "Roman Catholic law-
yer." P. 330. Noonan, however, fares much better than Reagan Associate Deputy Attorney
General Bruce Fein - whom Garrow refers to as "[a]n undistinguished but often-quoted
one-time Justice Department official" (p. 267) - and Fordham law professor Robert M.
Byrn, who Garrow describes as "a forty-year-old bachelor who still lived with his mother" (p.
522).
13. David J. Garrow, David Garrow on Roe v. Wade, Rrs., Apr.-Junle 1994, at 2,4 (inter-
view with Edith Tiger).
14. This lesson is implicit in Liberty and Sexuality. Garrow's technique is to sweep his
readers away in a tidal wave of information and, after they have recovered from this factual
onslaught, to let them reach whatever conclusions they may. For many reviewers of Liberty
and Sexuality, Garrow's refusal to explain what lessons should be drawn from his narrative is
a frustrating shortcoming. Se4 e.g., Gerald Rosenberg, Political Processes and Institutions, 23
CoNTEmp. Socy. 656 (1994); R. Alta Charo, The Civil Rights Struggle Over Human Repro-
duction, 26 FAm. PLAN. Pins. 181 (1994) (book review); Kristin Luker, The Hard Road to
Roe, N.Y. TAms, Feb. 20,1994, § 7 (Book Review) (reviewing LIBERTY AND SEXUAtrY), at
7. For me, I rather liked being left to my own devices to make sense of the extraordinary
mass of uniformly well-presented information that is Liberty and Sexuality.
15. Nomination of Robert H. Bork To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
1, at 116 (1987) (statement of Robert H. Bork).
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg - against Roe as being counterproductive to
the prochoice movement, Garrow's history lesson makes clear that
the prochoice movement was necessarily dependent upon judicial
action.
Garrow's history lesson is incomplete, however. While demon-
strating that Roe was a necessary step to the creation of meaningful
abortion rights, Liberty and Sexuality inaccurately infers that the
story of reproductive freedom is one of judicial resistance to legisla-
tures dominated by prolife interest groups. Garrow does not con-
sider the ways in which judicial decisionmaking and elected
government action affected each other. For example, although Lib-
erty and Sexuality considers post-Roe developments up through the
Supreme Court's 1992 reaffirmation of abortion rights in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,16 it limits its sights to court-related action.
Garrow does not give any meaningful treatment to legislation and
regulation designed to alter the face of abortion rights. More signif-
icantly, he does not consider the ramifications of such elected gov-
ernment action on Court decisionmaking. Garrow simply cannot
achieve his grander objective of helping "people to appreciate what
Roe really represents"' 7 without considering the constitutional dia-
logue that has taken place between the courts and elected govern-
ment in the three decades since Griswold and the two decades since
Roe.
That Garrow's presentation is incomplete reveals Liberty and
Sexuality's obsession with elevating the stature of Roe v. Wade to a
victory for American freedom on the order of Brown v. Board of
Education. At one level, Garrow's comparison fails because Brown
is generally understood to be "the greatest moral triumph constitu-
tional law ha[s] ever produced,' 3 whereas honorable people can
disagree about the moral rightness of a decision that places repro-
ductive autonomy ahead of potential human life. Yet, even if the
Roe-Brown analogy is appropriate - as it almost certainly is for a
good many of Garrow's readers - Brown itself points to the neces-
sity of getting beyond Supreme Court decisions and into elected
government action in explicating the shaping of constitutional val-
ues. Just as the story of Brown must include southern resistance,
the 1964 Civil Rights Act,19 and the busing controversy, the story of
Roe v. Wade encompasses abortion funding restrictions, the "gag
rule," and several other legislative and executive initiatives.
16. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
17. A Conversation with David J. Garrow, supra note 11.
18. Boxru, supra note 5, at 77.
19. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended principally at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
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This review will help put Roe in proper perspective by consider-
ing the ways that elected government and judicial action influence
each other. In particular, the story of abortion rights must consider
how social and political forces contributed to the Court's modera-
tion of Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a decision that re-
placed Roe's stringent trimester standard with a less demanding
"undue burden" test.2 0 While this exercise may deflate Roe's
achievements, it will also point to the pivotal role that Supreme
Court decisions play in elected government deliberations. Specifi-
cally, when considering the constitutionality of legislative and regu-
latory initiatives, elected government has looked to Supreme Court
decisions as the defining benchmark. Furthermore, rather than ap-
proving legislation or regulations directly at odds with Roe, elected
government has expressed its opposition through funding bans and
other indirect techniques. Finally, and most significantly, Roe and
its progeny shaped elected government attitudes toward abortion.
The result of this interaction is that despite the Casey Court's re-
turning much of the abortion issue to the states, state lawmakers -
apparently preferring the Roe-created status quo - no longer ap-
pear interested in enacting antiabortion restrictions.
Liberty and Sexuality recognizes neither the profound role
played by political and social influences in Court decisionmaking
nor the equally profound effect of Court decisionmaking in shaping
the scope and sweep of elected government action. Garrow's book
is nonetheless monumental - far and away the definitive guide to
the Court's reasoning in and the political developments that pre-
ceded Griswold and Roe. This review, building upon Garrow's les-
sons regarding the Supreme Court's role in the abortion dispute,
offers an alternative paradigm to the one Garrow suggests. Part -
of this review summarizes Liberty and Sexuality's ample teachings
about the leadership role that courts played in fueling the reproduc-
tive autonomy movement. Without decisions like Griswold and
Roe, as Liberty and Sexuality makes clear, it is uncertain whether
and when the political process would have recognized an individ-
ual's right to reproductive freedom. Part II of this review extends
the teachings of Liberty and Sexuality by considering the ways
elected government and the courts influence each other.
I. TIE ROAD TO RoE
Liberty and Sexuality is at its best when demonstrating the ne-
cessity of judicial action to make reproductive freedom meaningful,
particularly by using the stories of those involved in this crusade.
Contrary to what we are led to believe by the self-serving revision-
20. 112 S. Ct. at 2819.
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ist histories of conservatives who dislike judicially created rights
and progressives who now see the legislatures as more rights-
protective than the courts, the evisceration of Connecticut's an-
ticontraception statute and the establishment of meaningful abor-
tion rights required judicial intervention.
A. Birth Control in Connecticut
Garrow's presentation of the story of Griswold is truly a revela-
tion, for the Bork view that Griswold was simply a test case put
together by a group of elites at the Yale law school is widely shared.
Indeed, during my first year of teaching, I was told a tale about how
the wife of Yale University's president - who, along with her
upper-crust friends, was active in Planned Parenthood - convinced
New Haven's chief of police at a cocktail party to arrest her for
violating the otherwise unenforced anticontraception statute.21 The
truth of the matter is that the Connecticut law blocked the opera-
tion of family planning clinics, preventing poor women from,
among other things, being able to be fitted for diaphragms.22 Ro-
man Catholic hospitals in several Connecticut cities, moreover, dis-
missed from their staffs doctors who publicly opposed the
anticontraception statute.23 While men were able to purchase con-
doms at gas stations, drug stores, and the like (p. 128), and women
of means were able to skirt the Connecticut law through state-
condoned diaphragm fittings at the offices of noncomplying physi-
cians (p. 136), the effect of the anticontraception statute was hardly
imaginary.
The real story of Griswold begins in 1939. In June of that year,
the Catholic Clergy Association of Waterbury passed a resolution,
"read from the pulpit of each and every Roman Catholic Church in
Waterbury," condemning birth control as "contrary to the natural
law and therefore immoral" and calling for the enforcement "to the
full extent of the law" of an 1879 Connecticut criminal statute sanc-
tioning individuals who use or assist in the use of contraceptives (p.
5). Drafted by P.T. Barnum - "of circus fame" (p. 16) - and
supported by Catholic church officials who argued that "[t]he Crea-
tor gave the sex function for just one purpose" (p. 17), the Connect-
icut law was generally ignored and seemed destined to become
obsolete when the Waterbury clergy made their appeal. In re-
sponse to the clergy's call to shut down the recently opened Water-
bury Maternal Health Center, however, police raided the clinic and
arrested its physician-directors. Following a state supreme court
21. Garrow lists several versions of this story. See pp. 267-68.
22. P. 171. Many of these women traveled to New York state for diaphragm fittings. P.
139.
23. See Dudziak, supra note 9, at 928-29.
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decision upholding the statute,2 the Waterbury clinic and all other
birth control clinics in Connecticut closed their doors (pp. 77-78).
For the next twenty-five years, family planning advocates in
Connecticut - led by Kit Hepburn, the actress's mother and an
activist whose reform efforts date back to 1910 (pp. 9-10) - unsuc-
cessfully lobbied the Connecticut legislature to repeal the 1879 stat-
ute. Despite a pronounced "gap between the practices of Catholic
lay people and the proclamations of church officials,"'' 5 the
Catholic-dominated Connecticut Senate repeatedly stymied legisla-
tive reform in Connecticut. Testifying before the Connecticut legis-
lature about "'moral principles which are the foundation of this
law'" (p. 127) and using its pulpits to inform parishioners that
"'support of any candidate advocating birth control measures is a
violation of the natural law of God'" (p. 118), the Catholic Church
was a special interest far more powerful than the combined force of
family planning advocates and public opinion.
With no meaningful prospect for legislative reform, birth control
advocates turned their attention to the courts. In Tileston v. Ull-
man26 and Poe v. Ullman,27 however, Connecticut state courts and
the U.S. Supreme Court proved unsympathetic to these efforts.
The Supreme Court's attitude - brilliantly, and thoroughly can-
vassed in Liberty and Sexuality - was akin to the view later ex-
pressed by Judge Bork, namely, that the Connecticut statute was
unenforced and therefore a nullity. It did not matter to the Court
that the anticontraception statute was challenged by doctors unable
to treat their patients as well as married couples who faced signifi-
cant pregnancy-related threats to their physical health (pp. 144-46).
For Chief Justice Earl Warren, the plaintiffs - seeking to force the
Court to embrace the then-discredited doctrine of substantive due
process - had made the Justices" 'guinea pigs for an abstract prin-
ciple'" (p. 181). To prove this point, Justice Felix Frankfurter
called Waterbury prosecutor Bill Fitzgerald to discuss his affidavit
that any person who violates the 1879 statute "'must expect to be
prosecuted and punished'" (p. 187). This remarkable conversation
confirmed Frankfurter's intuition that there was little threat of
prosecution under the Connecticut statute.
Although the Supreme Court had declared the Connecticut law
a practical nullity, Planned Parenthood - both fearing prosecu-
tions and hoping to change the law through judicial or legislative
reform - had yet to violate the 1879 statute. Consequently, with
24. State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856 (Conn. 1940).
25. P. 164. When Griswold was argued, seventy-eight percent of Catholics thought that
birth control information should be widely available. P. 229.
26. 26 A.2d 582 (Conn. 1942).
27. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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no birth control clinics in Connecticut, Poe forced Planned
Parenthood to choose between open defiance of the law by provid-
ing contraceptive services and legislative reform efforts, which had
proven unsuccessful for close to fifty years. The former course was
chosen. One day after Poe, Planned Parenthood openly declared its
intention to violate the law by publicly offering contraceptive serv-
ices, noting in a press statement that they "would 'of course wel-
come prosecution by the state' so that the 'absurd and antiquated'
1879 law could be removed from the books" (p. 196). Within one
week of the clinic's opening, police arrested Estelle Griswold, presi-
dent of Connecticut's Planned Parenthood Federation, and Lee
Buxton, the former chair of the obstetrics and gynecology depart-
ment at Yale's medical school, presenting the Court with a clearly
justiciable challenge to the 1879 statute.28
The Supreme Court found itself in a quandary with Griswold.
Earl Warren's decision to assign the case to William 0. Douglas -
whose cavalier approach to opinion writing revealed an "inatten-
tion to legal detail and indifference to precedent" 29 - did not help
matters. His initial Griswold draft, as Garrow points out, "may
have taken more than twenty minutes [to write], but not [by] much"
(p. 245). Unwilling to utilize the substantive due process analysis
that he and other New Dealers fought so hard to defeat, Douglas
relied on the First Amendment's right of association, an approach
that prompted Justice Hugo Black to state at conference that the
"'right of husband and wife to assemble in bed is a new right of
assembly to me'" (p. 245). Recognizing the failings of Douglas's
initial approach, William Brennan and his law clerk Paul Posner de-
vised an alternative strategy. "'Instead of expanding the First
Amendment,' "Brennan wrote Douglas, why not say the Connecti-
cut statute violates the right to privacy " 'created out of the Fourth
Amendment and the Fifth, together with the Third'" (p. 247).
From this letter emerged Douglas's recognition of a right to privacy
"emanating" from the "penumbras" surrounding various provisions
of the Bill of Rights.30
28. Specifically, in response to pressure from James G. Morris, "a forty-two-year-old
West Haven Roman Catholic father of five [who] was the night manager of Avis Rent-a-Car's
Downtown Garage," (p. 202) New Haven police investigated a just-opened family planning
clinic. There they found Estelle Griswold who "was quite overjoyed to see them" and
promptly told police of action she had taken in "violation of the [1879] law." P. 203.
29. ScHwARerz, WARREN CouRT, supra note 9, at 237 (quoting JAMES F. SIMON, IN.
DEPENDENT JouRNEY: THm LnF OF WILLIAM 0. DouoLAs 252-53 (1980)).
30. This Brennan-inspired alternative also seemed silly, "attract[ing] the giggles" of the
Justices' clerks. P. 249. Several Justices considered alternative approaches, none of which
attracted significant support. Arthur Goldberg settled on a Ninth Amendment strategy and
instructed his law clerk - now Supreme Court Justice - Stephen Breyer "to undertake the
appropriate research and preliminary drafting." P. 250. Another approach - suggested by
Warren law clerk and Roe critic John Hart Ely - was to invalidate the 1879 law on equal
protection grounds by looking at "how the Connecticut statute prevented the operation of
1440 [Vol. 93:1433
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That Griswold might reinvigorate substantive due process deci-
sionmaking, with the benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight, seems
hardly surprising. When Griswold was decided, however, the Court
was clearly uncomfortable with taking this step. Liberty and Sexu-
ality makes this abundantly clear. Warren's discomfort with sub-
stantive due process explains his decision not to assign Griswold to
John Marshall Harlan (p. 243), who - with the help of his law clerk
and later Reagan Solicitor General Charles Fried3' - had earlier
relied on substantive due process analysis in attacking the constitu-
tionality of the Connecticut statute (p. 195). Moreover, while many
of the Justices spoke of the marital right to privacy in their Gris-
wold determinations, these Justices recognized that it would be
quite a trick "to persuasively articulate how one or another ac-
cepted constitutional doctrine applied to the Connecticut statute"
(pp. 243-44; emphasis added). The Court never accomplished this
trick. For better or worse, Griswold began the Court's descent
down the slippery slope that ultimately led it to Roe's formal em-
brace of substantive due process decisionmaking.
B. From Griswold to Roe
A New York University law student, Roy Lucas, discovered the
Griswold-Roe nexus in the fall of 1966.32 That neither the repro-
ductive rights community nor legal academics saw Griswold as the
first step to court-ordered abortion rights now seems remarkable.
At the time of Griswold, however, there was little reason to think
that the Supreme Court was prepared to seize on substantive due
process doctrine to alter fundamentally the laws of nearly every
state. Garrow, while sympathetic to the Court's expansive use of
privacy, makes clear that the Griswold-Roe connection was barely
imaginable until fledgling law graduate Roy Lucas began convinc-
ing federal courts to strike down antiabortion laws in the late 1960s.
Before Griswold, the thought of a constitutional right to abor-
tion seemed farfetched. Birth control pioneer Margaret Sanger, in
explaining her opposition to Connecticut's anticontraception law,
"'emphasized strongly that the advocates of birth control are not in
favor of abortion, but desire only to prevent the beginning of life'"
(p. 17). The original legal challenge to the Connecticut law, more-
over, labeled "contraception the 'antithesis' of abortion... [which]
birth control clinics for the poor, but not the provision of similar services to better-off pa-
tients of private physicians." P. 237. While prochoice critics of Roe now embrace this tactic,
none of the Griswold-era Justices pursued this approach. P. 250.
31. Fried informed Harlan before oral arguments in the Poe case that "'individual mar-
ried couples have a right to engage in marital relations in the privacy of iheir own con-
sciences,." P. 174.
32. Roy Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration
of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C. L. REv. 730 (1968).
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'the State has the right to control.' ",33. With few exceptions pre-
Griswold abortion rights advocates opposed efforts to repeal an-
tiabortion measures in favor of less-sweeping reforms. In 1959, for
example, Alan Guttmacher spoke of" 'vigorously oppos[ing]'" any
proposal for "'unrestricted legal abortion'" (p. 278).
Griswold and its immediate aftermath likewise reveal a sharp
divide between the contraception and abortion issues. When the
Court heard Griswold, Planned Parenthood attorney and Yale law
professor Thomas Emerson noted at oral arguments that the invali-
dation of the anticontraception law would not create a right to
abortion. Emerson claimed that "'[t]he conduct that is being pro-
hibited in the abortion cases"' does not "'occur in the privacy of
the home" and that" '[abortion] involves taking what has begun to
be a life.'-34 In the Court's private deliberations of Griswold,
moreover, Earl Warren went out of his way to distinguish the Con-
necticut statute from antiabortion measures, "implying that he
thought such laws were valid. '35 More striking than the Court's
consideration of Griswold, as Liberty and Sexuality reveals, is the
first wave of reactions to the case. Roy Lucas's initial choice for
faculty sponsor, Norman Dorsen - who later served as president
of the American Civil Liberties Union - was not enthusiastic
about the project. As Lucas later recalled, "'People thought it was
a weird idea. My professors kind of laughed at me'" (p. 337). The
civil liberties community too thought that Griswold did not provide
an adequate basis to challenge abortion laws. In February 1966, the
ACLU concluded that" 'restrictive abortion laws ... while unduly
restrictive, are not so unreasonable as to be unconstitutional'" and
that" 'society could decide... to place such value on the life of the
unborn child as to render abortion possible only in a narrow range
of circumstances'" (p. 313).
How then did an idea first concocted in the spring of 1967 when
Roy Lucas finished his law school paper make its way to the
Supreme Court four years later when certiorari was granted in Roe?
Liberty and Sexuality does a superb job of chronicling the meteoric
rise of court-ordered abortion rights, beginning with a July 1968
model brief prepared by Lucas and culminating with the Court's
decision in Roe.
For starters, the principal impetus for court-ordered reform
came from the courts themselves. In 1968, retired Supreme Court
Justice Tom C. Clark advanced a Griswold-based right to abortion,
33. P. 70; see also p. 274.
34. P. 240. Emerson, however, did suggest in a 1965 Michigan Law Review symposium
on Griswold that the Court might be willing to recognize abortion rights. Thomas I. Emer-
son, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MicH. L. Rnv. 219 (1965).
35. SCHWARTZ, WARREN COURT, supra note 9, at 239.
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at least "until the time that life is present. ' 36 Yet in early 1969 the
principal focus of the reform movement was legislative liberaliza-
tion in New York and other states (p. 367). Although Roy Lucas
seemed determined to launch a series of coordinated test case chal-
lenges (p. 381), judicial reform did not take hold until the fall of
1969, when courts in California and Washington, D.C. rejected state
efforts to prosecute doctors for violating antiabortion restrictions.
In one case, People v. Belous,37 the California Supreme Court de-
clared that "[t]he fundamental right of the woman to choose
whether to bear children follows from the Supreme Court's and this
court's repeated acknowledgement of a 'right to privacy.' 38 In
United States v. Vuitch,39 federal district court judge Gerhard Gesell
spoke of "increasing indication" in Supreme Court decisions that
the "right of privacy... may well include the right to remove an
unwanted child at least in early stages of pregnancy. ' '40
With Belous and Vuitch, the prochoice community began to
grasp the obvious, namely, that courts were far more likely than
legislators to liberalize abortion rights. The most visible of these
challenges, of course, is Roe itself. Garrow makes clear that the
Roe litigation, unlike the NAACP's deliberative strategy in
Brown,41 was decidedly haphazard - much closer to spontaneous
combustion than to the carefully drawn plans of some national in-
terest group.
The chain reaction that ultimately produced Roe v. Wade began
in March 1969, when women members of the University of Texas's
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) turned to gender issues
after witnessing "the disagreeably sexist behavior of SDS's male na-
tional leaders" at an SDS National Council meeting (p. 389). One
manifestation of this shift was the distribution of information on
how to obtain an abortion in Mexico. Perceiving that more needed
to be done, these women asked Sarah Weddington - a 1967 Texas
law graduate - whether she would consider launching a constitu-
tional challenge to Texas's antiabortion law (p. 395). Weddington
agreed, enlisted the. help of her law school classmate Linda Coffee,
and waited for a plaintiff to materialize. Thanks to serendipity, a
pregnant woman who wanted an abortion, Norma McCorvey,
36. P. 372 (quoting Tom C. Clark, Religion; Morality, and Abortion: A Constitutional
Appraisal, 2 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1969)).
37. 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969).
38. Belous, 458 P.2d at 199 (quoted at p. 377).
39. 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969), revd., 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
40. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. at 1035, quoted at p. 382.
41. On the NAACP's litigation strategy, see JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE
CouRTs (1994) (reviewed in this issue by Professor Margaret Russell - Ed.); RicaRD
KLUGER, SiMPLE JUSTIcE (1975); MARK V. Tus-N T, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY
AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987).
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quickly emerged and granted her permission to launch a Jane Roe
challenge to the Texas law.42
While the rest may be history, Liberty and Sexuality does a phe-
nomenal job of exposing how many rocks there were on the road to
Roe. Far from a pitched battle between high-powered veteran law-
yers, the contest between Weddington and Coffee, and the State of
Texas reveals the grass-roots nature of the Roe challenge. Wed-
dington and Coffee did their own typing in filing their original com-
plaint and brief (pp. 438-39). In preparing their Supreme Court
filings, Weddington in particular confronted a lack of resources, ne-
cessitating her lawyer-husband's last minute participation in the
brief drafting, and the help of an overly aggressive Roy Lucas, who
- as head of the poorly run Madison Institute - sought to dis-
place her as lead counsel in the case 43 For the State of Texas, Roe
inspired a less-than-vigorous defense. The bulk of the Texas brief
was lifted directly from a prolife amicus filing by two hundred and
twenty-two physicians - a brief that had been shared with the state
for this very purpose.44
Internal Supreme Court deliberations likewise reveal that when
Roe was first argued, its landmark status was anything but inevita-
ble. The original Blackmun draft, as revealed by Bernard Schwartz
in 1988, struck down the Texas statute on vagueness grounds and
expressly rejected the argument that "'a pregnant woman has an
unlimited right to do with her body as she pleases.' -45 How this
weak-kneed approach to abortion rights evolved into Roe's express
embrace of substantive due process and its unyielding trimester test
is one of the highlights of Liberty and Sexuality. For starters,
42. Norma McCorvey - unlike the challengers to the Connecticut anticontraception
statute - was indigent, uneducated, and not particularly interested in reshaping the direction
of constitutional jurisprudence. P. 404. In convincing McCorvey, Coffee "stressed that being
a plaintiff would not take much time, would not entail any costs, and almost certainly would
not require any courtroom testimony or public identification." Id. True to Coffee's word,
McCorvey was out of the loop throughout the Roe litigation.
43. Pp. 461-62. Lucas's aggressive tactics were not appreciated. Sarah Weddington even-
tually cut off communication with Lucas. P. 564. Prochoice lawyers also shut Lucas out of
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), Roe's companion case. P. 463. In the end, while Lucas
played an instrumental role in framing the prochoice litigation strategy, his self-righteous and
intrusive posturing alienated him from much of the reproductive autonomy community. See
pp. 463-64, 469-70, 493, 505.
44. Pp. 510-11. Texas did not help its position at oral argument. Jay Floyd, who argued
the case on behalf of Texas, began his argument with an off-color remark. Referring to Sarah
Weddington and Linda Coffee, Floyd commented: "It's an old joke, but when a man argues
against two beautiful ladies like this, they are going to have the last word." Oral Argument
Transcript, 410 U.S. 113 (1993) (No. 70-18), reprinted in 75 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGU-
MENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW 796 (Philip
B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). Floyd further weakened his case by responding to
a question about Texas's choice to specify that life begins at conception by waxing philosoph-
ically that "there are unanswerable questions in this field" and "[w]hen does the soul come
into the unborn - if a person believes in a soul - I don't know." 75 Id. at 804.
45. ScHwARTz, BURGER COURT, supra note 9, at 90.
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Warren Burger's decision to assign Roe, and its companion Georgia
case, Doe v. Bolton46, to Harry Blackmun - according to William
Douglas at least - reeks of the Chief Justice's manipulation of his
case assignment authority. Although Blackmun was willing to
strike down the Texas statute, Douglas's conference notes suggest
that both Burger and Blackmun approved of Georgia's draconian
restrictions on abortion rights (p. 533). Matters were further com-
plicated when Blackmun signed onto a Burger-led effort to have
Roe and Doe reargued so that newly confirmed Nixon appointees
Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist could participate in the deci-
sion. According to Blackmun, "I believe, on an issue so sensitive
and so emotional as this one, the country deserves the conclusion of
a nine-man, not a seven-man court" (p. 552; emphasis added).
Contrary to Burger's apparent intent, reargument, thanks to
Lewis Powell's firming up the prochoice coalition, moved the Roe
draft towards an absolutist prochoice posture.47 Not only did Pow-
ell support overturning the Texas and Georgia statutes, but "he
thought Roe 'should [be] the lead case' and that he would decide it
not on vagueness grounds but on the more basic issue" (p. 575).
Combusting with a strengthened majority, Brennan and Marshall
- in a critical letter written by Marshall's law clerk Mark Tushnet
- successfully lobbied Blackmun for the establishment of a trimes-
ter standard guaranteeing women an unqualified right to abortion
during the first three months of pregnancy (pp. 583-85). Although
Potter Stewart objected to this "inflexibly legislative" approach,
Blackmun concluded that such judicial policymaking, while "arbi-
trary," was "not to be avoided."48
C. Judicial v. Legislative Reform
The Court designed Roe v. Wade to put an end to the abortion
dispute. Justice Harry Blackmun put forth a trimester test gov-
erning state authority over the abortion decision both to make clear
what the Court intended and to limit future governmental efforts to
sidestep the Court's decision. Indeed, Blackmun implored his col-
leagues to decide Roe " 'no later than the week of January 15 to tie
in with the convening of most state legislatures'" (p. 585) and pro-
posed issuing a press statement to accompany the decision - some-
thing that had never been done and ultimately was not done here
- to keep the press from" 'going all the way off the deep end'" in
reporting news of the decision (p. 587).
46. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
47. JomxN C. JEFFRms, JR., JusncE LEwis F. PowELu, JR. 332-52 (1994) (reviewed in this
issue - Ed.).
48. Bob Woodward, The Abortion Papers, WASHL Posr, Jan. 22, 1989, at D1, D2.
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Blackmun's efforts here reveal that politics played a large role
in both the content and packaging of Roe. When he announced the
decision, however, Blackmun started his opinion by observing that
the judicial task was "to resolve the issue by constitutional measure-
ment, free of emotion and of predilection. ' 49 Portraying the Court
as being above the political fray, the supreme pursuer of constitu-
tional truth in our three-branch system, Blackmun apparently
sought to strengthen the Court's legitimacy and to ensure that
states widely followed Roe.50 Twenty years later, in announcing his
retirement, Blackmun declared victory. With prochoice president
Bill Clinton at his side and Roe's reaffirmation recently secured,
Blackmun described Roe as "a step that had to be taken as we go
down the road to the full emancipation of women.151
Whether Blackmun's claims about Roe's achievements and the
legacy Blackmun left us through Roe are more ethereal than real is
the question du jour. Over the past several years, prochoice liberals
have increasingly savaged Roe. Political scientist Gerald Rosen-
berg, for example, contends that Roe "was far less responsible for
the changes that occurred than most people think" 52 and that the
growth of right-to-life forces in the wake of the decision suggests
"that one result of litigation to produce significant social reform is
to strengthen the opponents of such change. ' 53 More strikingly,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in December 1992, lambasted Roe for "pro-
long[ing] divisiveness and deferr[ing] stable settlement of the [abor-
tion] issue" by short-circuiting early 1970s legislative reform
efforts.54 On another occasion, Ginsburg attacked Roe as "[h]eavy-
handed judicial intervention" and said that it "ventured too far in
the change that it ordered.' '55
What gives? With tens of thousands of legislative proposals,
countless executive initiatives, wicked Supreme Court confirmation
battles, and more acrimony than any social policy issue since slav-
ery, it seems a little late in the day to wonder whether or not Roe
mattered. Nevertheless, a slew of highly regarded political scien-
tists and constitutional lawyers - most of whom are avidly
49. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
50. Blackmun advanced similar claims in subsequent abortion decisions. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2854 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment
in part concurring in part, and dissenting in part); Thomburg v. American College of Obst. &
Gyn., 476 U.S. 747, 759, 771 (1986).
51. Linda Greenhouse, The Nation: How a Ruling on Abortion Took on a Life of Its
Own, N.Y. TwiEs, Apr. 10, 1994, § 4, at 3.
52. GERALD N. RosENBERG, THE HoLLow HoPE 201 (1991).
53. I. at 342.
54. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185, 1208
(1992).
55. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe
v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv. 375, 381, 385 (1985).
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prochoice - now depict Roe as counterproductive, a "hollow
hope. ' 56 For this new wave of Court critics, only social movements
and elected branch action accomplish meaningful reform.
Roe's progressive critics emphasize that in the decade preceding
the decision, the abortion pendulum had begun to swing.57 In 1962,
the Model Penal Code was amended to authorize abortions when
the health of the mother was endangered, when the infant might be
born with incapacitating physicaL or mental deformities, or when
the pregnancy was a result of rape or incest. In 1967, the American
Medical Association endorsed the Model Penal Code's limited ap-
proval of abortion. In 1971, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws drafted a Uniform Abortion Act
that would have placed no limitations on abortion during the first
twenty weeks of pregnancy. By the time of Roe, seventeen states
had liberalized their abortion laws, principally adopting the limited
reforms of the Model Penal Code. Pointing to these developments,
Ginsburg and others maintain that the Court could have left it to
state legislatures to reform their abortion laws.58
Liberty and Sexuality meets these progressive critics of Roe
head on by demonstrating that despite changes in state law, the
medical profession, and public opinion, the reformers were fighting
an uphill battle. Many states rejected the Model Penal Code re-
form, and some states that enacted reform legislation imposed so
many restrictions that the number of legal abortions actually de-
creased.59 When the Court decided Roe, strict antiabortion laws re-
mained on the books in nearly every state. Contrary to Ginsburg's
claims, the abortion reform movement barely put a dent in state
laws criminalizing abortion. "[C]alculating that therapeutic excep-
tions bills were the most they could possibly attain," most prochoice
activists did not even seek repeal of criminal abortion statutes (pp.
359, 374).
The legislative battles leading up to Roe are telling for other
reasons. In the early stages of this reform movement, there was no
right-to-life movement. By the time of Roe, a vigorous right-to-life
movement was prepared to do battle with prochoice reformers. Of
great significance, in 1972, right-to-life activists helped defeat Mich-
igan and North Dakota referenda that would have repealed those
states' criminal abortion laws (pp. 576-77). In the months before
the Roe decision, moreover, prolife interests scored key legislative
56. See RosENBERG, supra note 52.
57. See Louis FiSHER & NEAL DEViNS, PouricAL DYNAMCS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
233-34 (1992).
58. See supra notes 52-55; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL.
L. REV. 751, 766-67 (1991).
59. EVA R. RUBiN, ABORTION, PouTncs, AND THE COURTS 23 (rev. ed. 1987).
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victories in Pennsylvania, where legislation allowing abortions only
when the mother's life was threatened was approved by a 157-to-34
vote, and in Massachusetts, which approved by 178-to-46 a bill that
specified conception as the beginning of human life (p. 547). In
New York, prolife forces, headed by the Roman Catholic Church,
were gaining momentum in an effort to repeal that state's permis-
sive abortion legislation (p. 368).
"From the immediate vantage point of 1973," Garrow con-
cludes, no one in the prochoice community - with memories of the
right-to-life mobilization effort "so freshly in mind" - expressed
any regret that the Supreme Court "had ruled that a woman's
choice with regard to abortion was a constitutionally protected right
rather than a criminally punishable preference that could be left to
the annual vagaries of state legislative votes or statewide popular
referenda" (pp. 616-17). While there is no way of telling precisely
what the political process would have yielded had the Court left the
abortion decision with the states,60 Garrow persuasively demon-
strates that the prospects of sweeping legislative reform were dim.
Most states did not reform their laws, and for the most part, those
that did made only minor alterations. Furthermore, a rapidly grow-
ing and increasingly powerful right-to-life movement raised doubts
about future reform efforts.
Liberty and Sexuality's defense of judicial intervention - at
least for supporters of reproductive rights - is convincing. The
stories of Roe and Griswold reveal that legislative majorities were
unwilling to expand reproductive rights. Whether one describes
this failure as the triumph of special interests or as the preservation
of moral norms, progressive defenders of the political marketplace
are "far off target. '61
II. Tim COUNrRMAJORrrARiAN PARADox
Garrow's proof that judicial intervention and "liberty and sexu-
ality" go hand in hand tells only part of the story of what Roe really
represents. Courts cannot go it alone in ordering massive social
change. Elected government action at the state and federal level
plays an integral role in the shaping of constitutional values. Lib-
erty and Sexuality, for all its virtues, is blinded by its obsession with
Court action. The book brushes aside state and federal responses
60. On this question, Jeffrey Rosen concludes that "[t]he political evidence that Garrow
collects fails to undermine Ginsburg's basic insight." Jeffrey Rosen, Penumbras Formed by
Emanations, A-LAriTc MoNTHLY, Apr. 1994, at 121, 122 (reviewing LIBERTY AND SEXUAL.
rr). Kathleen Sullivan, in contrast, concludes that "Garrow convincingly depicts the legisla-
tive success of the [right-to-life movement]." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Law's Labors, NEw
REti'auc, May 23, 1994, at 42, 44 (reviewing LIBERTY AND SEXUALrr).
61. David Garrow, History Lesson for the Judge: What Clinton's Supreme Court Nominee
Doesn't Know About Roe, WASH. PosT, June 20, 1993, at C3.
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to Roe - unless they concern attempts to shape Court doctrine
through judicial appointments or Supreme Court advocacy. In-
deed, Garrow's comprehensive discussions of the politics surround-
ing Connecticut's contraception ban and the limits of pre-Roe
legislative reform principally function as a foil to demonstrate the
necessity of judicial intervention.
While detailing the stories of the Roe and Griswold litigation is
a monumental achievement, Garrow's presentation is nonetheless
incomplete and, as a result, slightly misleading. This Part supple-
ments Garrow's history lesson by considering post-Roe politics.
Specifically, this Part calls attention to the wayscourts and elected
government shape constitutional values and each other.
A. Elected Government Attitudes Toward the Judiciary
Prochoice advocates' antipathy for elected government is easy
to understand. Before Roe, nearly every state outlawed or placed
significant restrictions on abortion access. Without Roe, moreover,
there is little reason to think - as Garrow ably demonstrates -
that state reform efforts would have amounted to much. Finally,
the bulk of post-Roe elected government activity appears downright
hostile, not just to Roe but to judicial authority as well.
Elected government resistance to abortion rights, however, does
not mean that the dialogue between the courts and governmental
actors is fundamentally adversarial - with the Court persistently
beating down elected government's attacks. Over the past two de-
cades, the courts have helped shape legislative norms. Of equal sig-
nificance, elected government reprisals - contrary to most writings
on this topic62 - reveal a profound respect for judicial authority
among elected government officials. In these ways, the Court's in-
fluence is even more profound than Liberty and Sexuality suggests.
To be sure, most elected government action has sought to limit
abortion rights. At the same time, no federal and virtually no state
action has directly challenged Supreme Court decisionmaking au-
thority. The campaign to have the Supreme Court overrule Roe,
for example, hardly calls judicial authority into question. The ap-
pointment of judges who disapprove of Roe as well as the filing of
briefs calling for Roe's overruling, instead, recognize that the fate of
Roe lies with the judiciary.
More telling than these Court-centered efforts, legislative and
regulatory initiatives reveal a willingness to work within parameters
set by the Supreme Court. At the federal level, a Republican-
controlled Senate rejected early 1980s proposals that sought to nul-
62. See, e.g., BARBARA H. CRAIG & DAVID . O'BRIEN, ABORTION AND AMERICAN




lify Roe - human life legislation, court-stripping, and constitu-
tional amendment. When the federal government did act, it never
directly called into question the correctness of Roe. Restrictions on
abortion funding, family planning services, and fetal tissue research
do not contradict Roe and its progeny. While these measures ex-
press a preference for childbirth and make access to abortion serv-
ices more difficult, none of these antiabortion efforts challenges the
constitutionality of the abortion right.
Drawing a line, as the federal government has done, between
judicial authority, which it does not challenge, and abortion access
- which, at least prior to the election of Bill Clinton, it did not
support - is much more than the triumph of form over substance.
That Congress and the White House have channeled their opposi-
tion to a judicial pronouncement in ways that do not openly contra-
dict Court decisionmaking is testament to the elected branches'
respect for the judiciary as a coequal branch of government. In-
deed, if anything, Congress and the White House have been ex-
traordinarily solicitous of the Court's abortion-related action.
When the elected branches engage in constitutional interpreta-
tion, the undisputable benchmark of their efforts is Supreme Court
decisionmaking. Not only are congressional reports and executive
branch testimony replete with citations to the U.S. Reports, but
neither executive branch officials nor legislators defend constitu-
tional positions at odds with the Supreme Court. When Bush ad-
ministration officials testified against Congress's efforts to use its
commerce power to codify Roe, for example, they never forth-
rightly embraced a theory of federalism at odds with Supreme
Court pronouncements; instead, they couched their federalism ar-
gument in public policy terms.63 Likewise, when the Senate Judici-
ary Committee considered human life legislation, only
subcommittee chair John East spoke of Congress's authority to in-
terpret independently the Constitution, but his subcommittee re-
port nonetheless emphasized Court decisionmaking. 64 Admittedly,
Court rulings are sufficiently open-ended that they present plenty
of fodder for prochoice and prolife forces. In addition, the invoca-
tion of Court decisions, rather than reflecting actual respect for the
Court, may be little more than a smoke screen designed to gain
partisan political advantage. The fact remains, however, that both
63. See Freedom of Choice Act of 1991: Hearing of the Sen. Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1991) (statement of John Harrison, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice) [hereinafter Harri-
son Testimony].
64. See SUBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF POWRS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICI-
ARY, 97TH CoNG., lsr Sass., THE HUMAN LIFE Biu.L S. 158: REPORT TOGETHER WITH ADDI-




sides of any given issue perceive that their constitutional arguments
will be taken seriously only if built around Court doctrine.
State responses to Roe, for the most part, follow a similar pat-
tern. Although forty-eight states passed abortion legislation in the
years following Roe, only a handful of states have played a leader-
ship role in enacting stringent abortion laws. Most states wait to
see if the courts will approve these "challenger" state initiatives. 65
Furthermore, most challenger state action is not clearly at odds
with Court decisions but tests the limits of these decisions. For ex-
ample, Roe did not explicitly address parental or spousal consent,
public funding, hospital-only abortions, and waiting periods, among
other things. State action on those subjects engages the judiciary in
a dialogue on the sweep of abortion rights; it does not necessarily
challenge Court authority.66
The possibility that elected government output may not mea-
sure elected government preferences also suggests that one should
not read too much into elected government resistance to Roe.
Many elected officials were quietly pleased by Roe. John Hart Ely,
for example, speaks of "[t]he sighs of relief as this particular alba-
tross was cut from the legislative and executive necks."67 That
states enacted an avalanche of abortion restrictions may only mean
that legislators saw no downside in responding to prolife interest
groups, for prochoice concerns were content to leave it to the courts
to protect their interests. In a sense, federal and state efforts to
limit abortion rights paid homage to a judiciary that would tow the
line and provide whatever constitutional protections were
appropriate.
Roe's transformation of the political marketplace, in other
words, was rooted in the belief that the Supreme Court would vig-
orously defend abortion rights. By legalizing abortion, Roe elimi-
nated the demand for prochoice legislation while leaving the
demand for prolife legislation unaffected, or perhaps even causing
it to grow. At the same time, Roe also increased the supply of
prolife legislation. Before the decision, the benefit the prochoice
65. *See Glen Halva-Neubauer, Abortion Policy in the Post-Webster Age, PUBmLUs, Sum-
mer 1990, at 27, 32-34.
66. There is an important caveat here; state efforts to limit the sweep of abortion rights
present - and are intended to present - the Court with an opportunity to rethink its posi-
tion on abortion. As such, these efforts are clearly antagonistic to Roe Nevertheless, virtu-
ally all state antiabortion efforts - by speaking to matters not explicitly addressed by the
Court - do not question the Court's authority to issue opinions or render judgments that
"have general applicability and deserve the greatest respect from all Americans." Edwin
Meese III, The Tulane Speech: What I Meant, WASH. PosT, Nov. 13, 1986, at A21, reprinted
in 61 TuLt L. REV. 1003 app. at 1004 (1987). See generally Symposium, Perspectives on the
Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decisions, 61 TUo- L. REv. 977 (1987).




movement obtained from a legislative victory was offset by the loss
the prolife movement sustained, and vice versa. But Roe elimi-
nated many, if not most, negative externalities associated with
prolife laws. By writing abortion rights into the Constitution, the
Court assured prochoicers that they could not lose the benefits they
had won. Specifically, because courts likely would invalidate an-
tiabortion measures that ran afoul of Roe's trimester test,
prochoicers had little reason to fight legislative efforts to limit abor-
tion access. Consequently, legislators voting on prolife bills no
longer had to worry that their prochoice constituents might com-
plain. Instead, they could vote for the bills so that the prolife activ-
ists would obtain a legislative benefit, while Roe ensured that
prochoice citizens would not suffer any measurable loss.
Despite the efforts of prolife groups to pass laws that might give
the Supreme Court an opportunity to limit Roe, between 1973 and
1989 the Court decided only a single major issue in their favor,
when it permitted states to refuse to fund poor women's abortions
through Medicaid. 68 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services69
changed all that. On the brink of overturning Roe, three Justices
declared "the rigid Roe framework" 70 unworkable and opened the
door to antiabortion legislation. Unlike Court rulings approving re-
strictions on federal funding of abortions, Webster signaled the
Court's readiness to limit abortion access for all women. By threat-
ening the rights of middle- and upper-class women, however, Web-
ster revealed a general contentment among federal and state
legislators with the Roe-created "status quo." Specifically, rather
than prompting a new wave of abortion regulation, legislative inac-
tion followed in Webster's wake.
The post-Webster calm reveals that many legislators would have
preferred that the Court retain control over abortion and not return
the issue to elected government. Grace Duke, a Republican Ohio
state legislator, spoke of "everyone hoping the courts would decide
and it wouldn't go through the legislatures."' William Black, a Re-
publican Illinois state legislator, began to support abortion rights in
the aftermath of Webster, "which he said had given new weight and
effect to his votes on abortion." 72 Even in Missouri, Webster came
as a not-entirely-welcome surprise to state legislators. "[Ninety-
five] percent who voted for this bill [upheld in Webster] believed it
68. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
69. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
70. 492 U.S. at 518 (Rehnquist, CJ., joined by white & Kennedy, JJ.).
71. Joe Frost, Americans in the Center Focus on Abortion Fight, Naw ORLEANs TIMES
PicAxuNE, Sept. 11, 1991, at A3.
72. William E. Schmidt, Onetime Abortion Foes Aren't So Sure Anymore N.Y. Timas,
Dec. 4, 1989, at A18.
1452 [Vol. 93:1433
The Countermajoritarian Paradox
didn't have a chance," 73 argued Missouri prochoice activist Mary
Bryant. "They looked at that preamble [specifying that life begins
at conception] and laughed. 'This is stupid. The court will never go
for it.' "74
Webster's transformation of the political marketplace, although
contrary to the predictions of prochoice and prolife interest groups
that an avalanche of antiabortion legislation would follow in the
decision's wake,75 is not surprising. Knowing that prochoice forces
were "going to take names and kick ankles," 76 Webster made right-
to-life initiatives less likely to succeed. The Roe-created "status
quo" became the governing norm, despite the fact that Roe had
earlier invalidated forty-six state laws.77
Planned Parenthood v. Casey78 tells a similar tale. When the
Court agreed to hear Casey in January 1992, abortion rights sup-
porters saw the "neck of Roe v. Wade squarely on the judicial chop-
ping block" and spoke of "[t]he days of safe and legal abortion in
America [as] numbered. ' 79 What the Court did, however, was to
embrace a middle-ground approach - reaffirming Roe but re-
jecting its stringent trimester standard in favor of a less-demanding
undue burden standard. As was true with Webster, the Court's rec-
ognition of broad state regulatory authority reinforced the post-Roe
status quo. Most state Attorneys General, for example, have re-
sisted enforcing existing state laws with Pennsylvania-type restric-
tions.80 Instead, Attorneys General returned the issue to the state
legislatures, claiming that lawmakers need to reaffirm their support
73. Cynthia Gorney, Taking Aim at Roe v. Wade, WASH. PosT, Apr. 9, 1989 (Magazine),
at 18.
74. Id.
75. Representative Chris Smith (R-N.J.), chair of the Congressional Pro-Life Caucus,
heralded Webster as "truly a significant victory for unborn children... [that] is likely to lead
to the enactment of state laws." Press Conference of the National Right to Life Committee,
Federal News Service, July 3, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File. Kate
Michelman, Executive Director of the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL),
went a step further, observing, "We are now careening down the slippery slope towards gov-
ernmental control of our most fundamental right. Women's lives hang by a thread, and the
Justices this morning handed the state politicians a pair of scissors." Press Conference on the
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services Decision, Kate Michelman, Executive Director, Na-
tional Abortion Rights Action League, Federal News Service, July 3, 1989, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File.
76. 135 CONG. REc. 18,170 (1989) (statement of Rep. Les AuCoin).
77. Webster also prompted a spate of prochoice legislative initiatives at both the state and
federal level. Connecticut, Maryland, Nevada, and Washington all responded to the decision
by passing protective legislation. At the federal level, Congress sought to loosen abortion
funding restrictions - only to be thwarted by a Bush veto - and took up freedom of choice
legislation to codify Roe v. Wade. See Fis-mR & DnvlNs, supra note 57, at 232-44.
78. 112 S. CL 2791 (1992).
79. Linda P. Campbell, Court To Hear Key Abortion Case; Cm. Tram., Jan. 22, 1992; § 1,
at 1, 10.
80. Mimi Hall, The Abortion Ruling: Day Two, USA TODAY, July 1, 1992, at 3A.
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for abortion restrictions by writing a new law. State legislators,
however, seem reluctant to enact antiabortion measures. Although
Casey has hardly slowed down the pace of abortion-related propos-
als - roughly three hundred measures were introduced in each of
the two years following the decision8 l - state responses to Casey
reenforce the post-Webster trend of diminishing state intervention
in abortion. Most striking, according to Alan Guttmacher Institute
studies, "antiabortion legislators [have] heeded... [Casey] and cur-
tailed their attempts to make abortion illegal."82 In 1994, for exam-
ple, no state introduced legislation to outlaw abortion.8 3
Furthermore, in the two years following Casey, a third of legislative
initiatives would have guaranteed the right to abortion.84 Finally,
of the handful of abortion regulation measures adopted since
Casey, most involve restrictions approved by the Court: waiting pe-
riods, informed consent, and parental notification.8 5
Casey's impact on federal abortion politics is also telling. Prior
to the decision - when there was reason to think that the Court
was set to overrule Roe v. Wade - Congress seemed poised to cod-
ify abortion rights through freedom of choice legislation. Casey's
qualified reaffirmation of Roe killed that effort, despite the fact that
freedom of choice legislation was far more protective of abortion
rights than the Court's newly minted "undue burden" standard.8
6
For many prochoice lawmakers, there no longer was adequate rea-
son for Congress to bear the decisional costs of taking a hard-line
position on abortion rights. After all, Roe - though crippled -
was clearly alive. Along the same lines, Congress saw no reason to
challenge directly the Court's decisionmaking authority - some-
thing it is typically reluctant to do in constitutional disputes - over
something as amorphous as the appropriate standard of review in
abortion cases.
Elected government perceptions about the judicial role and the
respect owed Supreme Court decisions figures prominently in the
story of abortion politics. To begin with, rather than independently
interpret the Constitution, elected officials frame their constitu-
tional arguments around Supreme Court decisions. Far more signif-
81. Alan Guttmacher Inst., Legislative Proposals and Actions, ST. REPROD. HEALTH
MoNrroR, May 1994, at i [hereinafter 1994 HEALTH MoNrroR; Alan Guttmacher Inst., Legis.
lative Proposals and Actions, ST. REPROD. HEALTH MoNrroR, Dec. 1993, at i [hereinafter
1993 HEALTH MoNrToR].
82. 1993 HEALTH MONITOR, supra note 81, at i.
83. 1994 HEALTH MoNrroR, supra note 81, at ii.
84. See 1994 HEALTH MoNrroR, supra note 81; 1993 HEALTH MoNrrOR, supra note 81.
85. See iL State refusal to act on Casey refutes the suggestion that Roe led to increased
public opposition to nontherapeutic abortions. See Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki,
Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme Cour Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM.
PoL. Sci. REv. 751 (1989).
86. See Harrison Testimony, supra note 63.
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icantly, elected government has chosen certain types of limited
responses and rejected more confrontational approaches. That is
quite significant, as is the fact that federal and state officials, while
supporting measures at odds with abortion fights, may well have
preferred that the Court maintain control over this issue. On this
point, the striking absence of elected government action following
the Court's recognition of substantial state regulatory power in
Webster and Casey suggests a seeming contentment with Court-
created abortion rights. Liberty and Sexuality, while heralding the
judicial intervention in Griswold and Roe, does not fully recognize
the impact of Court decisionmaking. The real story of Roe v. Wade,
contrary to Garrow's inference but supportive of his hypothesis,
reveals a surprising sensitivity of elected government to the
judiciary.
B. Social and Political Influences on Supreme Court
Decisionmaking
Just as the courts shape elected government, elected govern-
ment also shapes the courts. Liberty and Sexuality, by treating
Court decisionmaking as the sine qua non of the abortion dispute,
never considers the pivotal role that social and political influences
play in Court decisionmaking.
Throughout the post-Roe period, the Court validated elected
government efforts to limit abortion hights. Atthe federal level, the
Court approved several legislative and regulatory initiatives and
struck down none. By emphasizing Congress's power of the purse
and the deference owed to executive branch statutory interpreta-
tions, the Supreme Court upheld abortion funding restrictions in
Harris v. McRae;87 federally supported adoption counseling by reli-
gious organizations in Bowen v. Kendrick;s and regulations forbid-
ding family planning centers from discussing abortion in Rust v.
Sullivan.s9 These decisions make clear that the elected branches
play a vital role in the abortion dispute.
1992's Planned Parenthood v. Casey90 is a culmination of these
interchanges between the Court and elected government. After
five abortion-dominated Supreme Court confirmation hearings and
hundreds of thousands of abortion protesters marching each year at
its steps, the Court formally reconsidered and moderated Roe. By
simultaneously reaffirming abortion rights and gutting Roe's strin-
gent trimester test, Casey sought to find a middle ground between
two irreconcilable poles.
87. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
88. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
89. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
90. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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Casey is a remarkable decision. At one level, the Court seems
beside itself in self-doubt. Acknowledging that it can neither ap-
propriate funds nor command the military to enforce its orders, the
Court recognizes that its power lies "in its legitimacy, a product of
substance and perception that shows itself in the people's accept-
ance of the Judiciary."91 In other words, as psychologists Tom Tyler
and Gregory Mitchell observe, the Court seems to believe "that
public acceptance of the Court's role as interpreter of the Constitu-
tion - that is, the public belief in the Court's institutional legiti-
macy - enhances public acceptance of controversial Court
decisions." 92 This emphasis on public acceptance of the judiciary
seems proof positive that the outcome in Casey cannot be divorced
from the case's explosive social and political setting.93
Casey, however, goes to great lengths to declare that "social and
political pressures," 94 far from being relevant, must be resisted.
Otherwise, anarchy will rule the day, for our nation will have for-
saken its commitment "to the rule of law."95 For this reason, Casey
hinges its reaffirmation of Roe on stare decisis grounds. In other
words, whether or not the Court correctly decided Roe is beside the
point; the Court's institutional legitimacy and, with it, the rule of
law will be shattered if the Court "overrule[s] under fire."' 96 Be-
yond this rule of law claim, Casey invokes judicial supremacy to
defend its authority to settle the abortion dispute. Calling on the
"contending sides of a national controversy to end their national
division," 97 Casey implores the public to rise to the occasion by sub-
mitting to the Court.
All of this brings us to the $64,000 question: How independent
is the Court? Casey's middle-ground approach, as well as its em-
phasis on legitimacy and public acceptance, at face value, supports
91. 112 S. Ct. at 2814.
92. Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary
Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DuKE LJ. 703,
715 (1994).
93. Casey's middle-ground approach to both abortion rights and broad state regulatory
authority, without question, matched public opinion. Fifty-seven percent of voters supported
the Pennsylvania law. Wall Street Journal/NBC Poll, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1992, at Al. By a
fifty-nine to twenty-one percent margin, however, voters also said that they were more likely
to support candidates who support abortion rights in the 1992 elections. Wall Street Journall
NBC Poll WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1992, at Al. More specifically, "many Americans... sup-
port such restrictions on access to abortion services as requiring women younger than 18
years to get a parent's permission (70% to 73% approve), a 24-hour waiting period (69% to
81%), and requiring married women to inform their husbands before receiving an abortion
(62% to 69%)." Robert J. Blendon et al., The Public and the Controversy Over Abortion,
270 JAMA, 2871, 2873 (1993).
94. 112 S. Ct. at 2814.
95. 112 S. Ct. at 2814.
96. 112 S. Ct. at 2815.
97. 112 S. Ct. at 2815.
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the claim of Robert Dali, Richard Funston, and others that the
Supreme Court is molded by popular opinion.98 Dahl's landmark
1957 study found that the Court was hardly ever successful "in
blocking a determined and persistent lawmaking majority on a ma-
jor policy."99 Rather, with the appointments-confirmation process
enabling the elected branches to place on the Court individuals
whose political philosophies comport with majoritarian preferences,
Dahl concludes that "policy views dominant on the Court are never
for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the law-
making majorities of the United States."1 00 Funston's 1975 study
builds upon this theme. Arguing that only "during transitional peri-
ods, in which the Court is a holdover from the old coalition, [will]
the Court... perform the counter-majoritarian functions ascribed
to it by traditional theory,"101 Funston concludes that the Court is
typically a yea-saying branch. "The hypothesis, in other words, is
that, as Mr. Dooley so cryptically put it, 'the Supreme Court follows
the election returns.' "2
There is little doubt that the Court is sensitive to politics. The
abortion dispute, however, stands as a counterexample to Dahl and
Funston's broader claims about judicial compliance with lawmaking
majorities. To begin with, the Court has spoken with a
countermajoritarian voice throughout the abortion controversy.
Roe v. Wade invalidated forty-six state laws. From Roe to Webster,
the Court withstood an onslaught of state antiabortion measures,
striking most of them down and extending its reasoning in Roe.'0 3
Although the Court approved federal and state efforts to limit
abortion through appropriations and other indirect restrictions, the
Court never backed away from its conclusion that a woman has a
constitutionally protected right to terminate her pregnancy. Casey,
while severely limiting Roe, nonetheless reaffirmed Roe's "central
98. See Beverly B. Cook, Public Opinion and Federal Judicial Policy, 21 AM. J. POL SCI.
567 (1977); Robert A. Dahi, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957); Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and
Critical Elections, 69 AM. PoL Sci. REv. 795 (1975).
99. Dahli, supra note 98, at 286.
100. Id. at 285.
101. Funston, supra note 98, at 796.
102. Id. For the classic argument that the Court's principal function is to provide legiti-
macy to governmental conduct by upholding it as constitutional, see CHARLms L. BLACK, Jn.,
Tim PEOPLE Am Tm COURT (1960).
103. While many of these antiabortion measures were the triumph of well-organized and
intensely interested political minorities over a prochoice majority that left it to the courts to
protect their interests, it is nonetheless true that these measures were enacted through the
"majoritarian" political process. Consequently, although Court decisions striking down these
abortion restrictions may have matched public opinion, these Court decisions - like any




[countermajoritarian] holding."'u 4 In so doing, Casey invalidated a
spousal notification provision that has wide public-opinion
support.105
It is nonetheless incorrect to view the abortion dispute as the
triumph of law over politics. The Court has approved a broad
range of indirect restrictions on abortion rights and has significantly
moderated its Roe v. Wade holding. Much like elected govern-
ment's refusal to challenge Court decisionmaking authority directly,
the Court too seems respectful of elected government participation
in the shaping of constitutional values. Liberty and Sexuality errs in
not recognizing the interactive nature of constitutional decision-
making by failing to examine the ways in which elected government
and the courts have shaped each other. Liberty and Sexuality is
somewhat misleading in depicting the relationship between the
Court and elected government in linear adversarial terms. While
that depiction goes a long way in explaining the pre-Roe period,
which is the principal focus of Garrow's study, the Roe to Casey
period - which is clearly a part of Garrow's study - tells a much
different story.
III. CONCLUSION
A permanent feature of our constitutional Jandscape is the
ongoing tug and pull between elected government and the courts.
Without question, social and political forces "set[ ] the boundaries
for judicial activity and influence[] the substance of specific deci-
sions, if not immediately then within a few years."' 0 6 The Supreme
Court's repudiation of the trimester standard as well as its approval
of abortion funding restrictions and Reagan-era regulatory initia-
tives are therefore very much a part of "what Roe really repre-
sents."' 0 7 At the same time, by "placing issues on the agenda of
public opinion and of other political institutions [and] providing an
imprimatur of legitimacy to one side or another,"'01 8 Court action
affects majoritarian preferences. Roe makes clear how influential
Court decisions can be. It served as a benchmark in constitutional
deliberations undertaken by elected government. More strikingly,
Webster and Casey's noneventful aftermath reveals that Roe shaped
political attitudes toward abortion rights.
David Garrow's Liberty and Sexuality demonstrates Roe's mon-
umental impact in making abortion rights a reality. Without deci-
104. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2812 (1992).
105. Blendon et al., supra note 93, at 2873.
106. Louis Fisher, Social Influences on Constitutional Law, 15 J. Poi- Scx. 7, 8 (1987).
107. A Conversation with David J. Garrow, supra note 11.
108. Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. Pot.
Sci. Rv. 50, 63 (1976).
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sions like Griswold and Roe, there is little reason to think that the
1960s abortion reform movement would have succeeded. Liberty
and Sexuality drives this point home. Its thoroughgoing history of
pre-Roe politics is an achievement in and of itself - effectively re-
butting Robert Bork's suggestion that Griswold was superfluous as
well as the claims of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gerald Rosenberg, and
others that Roe did less to help the cause of reproductive autonomy
than people commonly suppose.
Liberty and Sexuality, happily, offers much more than a refuta-
tion of the historical foundations of Griswold's and Roe's critics.
The book also does a superior job of detailing the history of the
litigation strategy of the reproductive autonomy movement and the
deliberations of the Supreme Court Justices sympathetic to the
cause. While Garrow's focus on the prochoice side of the equation
makes his history a bit one-sided, he is meticulous and evenhanded
in telling this side of the story.
Where Liberty and Sexuality falters is in its failure to consider
the interactive nature of constitutional decisionmaking, especially
in the post-Roe era. History makes clear that courts and elected
government influence each other in significant ways. Garrow's his-
tory is too Court-centered to recognize these influences. Despite
this criticism, Liberty and Sexuality is indispensable reading for any-
one interested in uncovering the story of Roe v. Wade. With Roe's
landmark status assured, Liberty ahd Sexuality too will endure as
the definitive account of the Roe decision and the events leading up
to it.
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